| CORPORATION INCOME TAX For the post-transition
period the corporation income tax succeeds the
excess-profits tax as the measure of greatest interest to
the postwar tax planners. Perhaps the predominance of
business men and their spokesmen in the planners' ranks
accounts for this interest. What to do about the
so-called double taxation of corporate profits is the
principal problem raised in connection with the
corporation income tax. At the present time corporate
profits are taxed first to the corporations, then again
to the stockholders when they are distributed as
dividends. This means that distributed corporate earnings
are subject to two taxes, while other kinds of income are
subject to only one.
Is this double taxation or corporate profits real or
only apparent? The answer turn on whether the corporation
tax is borne by stockholders or is shifted to the
consumers in higher prices, or, alternatively, to workers
in lower wages, creditors in lower interest rates, and so
on. If the tax is shifted, it is not borne by the
stockholder, and he is not doubly taxes. /1/
| FOOTNOTE |
| /1/ However, the stockholder may be affected
adversely by the tax in other ways even though it
is shifted. |
Economists have traditionally taken this view that
general corporation taxes which are measured by net
income or profits are not shifted but fall on the
stockholders. But many other people, most business men
included, view corporation income and profits taxes as a
cost of production to be recouped through price. For
example, public utility regulating commissions in general
allow Federal income taxes as an expense in determining a
reasonable rate.
(It is also argued that even if the corporate tax does
rest on the stockholders, its burden has by this time
been largely removed by the process of capitalization as
reflected in the prices of securities. Accordingly, a
substantial tax decrease would give a windfall to present
stockholders. If high levels of national income are
maintained, corporate profits after taxes may rise to
unprecedented heights, thus enlarging the windfall.
Moreover, it is urged, this situation might lead to an
unfortunate stock market boom. To a lesser degree the
windfall point may be made even though the taxes are
eventually shifted, provided that the shifting takes
place gradually over a period of years. However, this
point applies neither to new businesses nor to new
investment in old businesses. In any event, its
significance appears to be temporary.)
Whether double taxation should continue permanently on
the ground that the corporate entity should be taxed as
such without regard to the stockholders is another
question. Some tax planners have maintained that the
double tax system should be retained both because a
corporate franchise is valuable and because corporate
business receives a large volume of costly service from
the Federal Government.
Whether views they hold on the questions of tax
shifting and taxing the corporate entity, the postwar tax
planners are virtually unanimous in maintaining that a
large part of the corporation tax falls on the
stockholder and that there is undesirable double taxation
of distributed corporate profits. No method of
eliminating double taxation, however, has gained common
acceptance. Several competing plans are proposed. The
advocates of each present strong arguments against the
others.
[One proposed method of eliminating double taxation of
corporate profits is to treat corporations like
partnerships. The partnership is not taxed as such, but
partnership income is attributed to the partners and
taxed to them when earned, whether or not they have
actually received it. Similarly, this method would impose
no tax on the corporation but would tax the stockholders
on their allocable share of the corporate profits when
earned, whether or not distributed in dividends. In
behalf of this method it is urged that there is minimum
tax interference with corporate management and maximum
equity among different businesses. However, the proposal
is strenuously opposed on the ground that a stockholder
frequently is not in position to secure control over the
income on which he must pay taxes and in fact may never
receive it. A share of stock might turn out to be more of
a liability than an asset. Moreover, the technical
problems and complications involved are generally agreed
to be exceedingly great.
Some planners have proposed to meet the difficulties
of the partnership method by requiring instead that
corporations make their profits available to stockholders
each year for dividends or reinvestment. They urge that
this would promote tax equity among stockholders and a
sounder relationship between corporation and stockholder.
The proposal has been strenuously opposed on the grounds
that it is a measure of corporate reform rather than a
tax measure and that it would destroy corporate growth
and expansion.
Unlike these two methods of eliminating double
taxation, other proposed methods make it advantageous
taxwise to retain earnings rather than to distribute them
as dividends. This is also true of existing law.
Repeal of the corporate income tax, leaving only the
individual income tax on the dividends received by the
stockholder, is another method of eliminating double
taxation. It is universally recognized that this
procedure, in the absence of other measures, would make
the corporation a tax-free haven for the accumulation of
income by stockholders who did not need the income for
current expenditure. Strengthening of the present tax on
the unreasonable accumulation of earnings has been urged
as a method of meeting this problem, but there is little
faith in its efficacy and it does not go to the heart of
the problem of tax-free accumulation of income.
The imposition of a tax on undistributed profits has
also been urged. A rat of less than 20 percent has been
suggested as sufficient to prevent accumulation of
earnings in the corporation without unduly penalizing
corporations which had to rely on earnings as a source of
capital for expansion.
A somewhat similar proposal is to continue a tax on
corporate profits but to allow the corporation a
deduction for dividends paid similar to the deduction now
allowed for interest paid. This method would eliminate
the preferential tax treatment which existing law grants
to bond financing over stock financing. Because it is in
the form of a reduction of present taxes on distributed
profits, this deduction is considered by many to be more
acceptable than a reduction in corporate tax rates
accompanied by a special tax on undistributed profits.
All of the arguments of earlier years have been
leveled against the proposals which involve heavier taxes
on undistributed profits than on distributed profits. It
has been urged that such taxes would coerce corporate
management into undesirable distribution of profits and
would penalize growing corporations. The carry-over of a
given year's profits for distribution over a period of
several years in one of the measures suggested to meet
this type of objection.
Another method of eliminating double taxation is to
apply a withholding tax to the corporation profits as the
time they are earned and to grant the stockholder credit
for this tax at the time the dividends are distributed.
The dividend to be included in the stockholder's tax
return would exceed the cash received by him by the
amount of tax withheld by the corporation, just as at the
present time the individual is taxed on his gross wage or
salary without allowance for the tax withheld at source.
However, the stockholder would be allowed a tax credit
for the amount of tax paid at source by the corporation,
and if this credit were in excess of his tax liability he
would be granted a refund. This method has long been used
in Great Britain.
An objection which has been made to the withholding
method is that individuals with low incomes and
tax-exempt organizations would receive refunds of tax.
This would involve administrative difficulties. Moreover,
some people would like to reach tax-exempt organizations
indirectly through the corporate tax.
Still another method of eliminating double taxation is
to allow the individual stockholder an exemption from the
normal individual tax with respect to dividends received
by him. The normal tax would be imposed at the rate
necessary to reduce double taxation to the extent
desired. This method was in operation prior to 1936,
although double taxation was only partially eliminated.
The dividend credit is supported as giving investment
incentives to individuals by reducing the rate of tax on
dividends below the level possible under other methods of
eliminating double taxation.
A disadvantage of this method is that its effective
operation requires a fixed relationship between the
corporation tax and the individual normal tax.
Flexibility and adaptability of the taxes is thus
impaired. Moreover, this method eliminates double
taxation more completely for stockholders subject to high
income tax rates than for those subject to lower rates,
and offers no relief at all to stockholders not subject
to individual income tax.
This method is criticized also on the ground that it
envisages a high rate of corporate tax, which would have
a restrictive impact on corporate managers. It is pointed
out also that if the corporate tax were entirely shifted
to consumers the dividends received by the stockholder
would be subject to a total of less tax than any other
form of income, thus discriminating in favor of income
earned through corporations.
A variant of the method of allowing an exemption from
part of the individual tax would be to allow dividends to
be included in individual income at some fraction, such
as 60 percent, of the amount of the dividend. While this
method has the advantage of simplicity, the relief it
grants from double taxation is much more strongly
weighted in favor of the higher income brackets than the
other methods of reducing double taxation.]
In addition to proposals regarding double taxation,
the postwar tax planners have made recommendations
regarding rates and exemptions of the corporation income
tax. Spokesmen for small business urge that a
lower-than-standard rate be continued for corporations
with incomes of less than $50,000, with an even greater
rate differential than exists at present. Some sentiment
has developed for a reintroduction of an exemption of
$2,000 or more to eliminate the smallest corporations
entirely. Proposals have been made also to combine the
normal tax and surtax in order to simplify the tax
structure.
There is almost unanimous agreement that a long period
of loss carry-over should be provided for businesses
generally. Such a period might extend for about five
years and would take the place of the present combination
of a two-year carryback and a two-year carryforwards of
losses. The carrybacks have introduced complications and
their permanent retention has not generally been favored.
Some emphasis has been placed on relaxing the rules
regarding depreciation. Two points of view are reflected.
The first would relax the administration of the
depreciation provisions so that the taxpayer might have
more flexibility in determining the rates to be charged.
The second would provide greater flexibility and, in
addition, would accelerate depreciation in the early
years of the life of the asset. An extreme example of
such acceleration would be the continuation of the
five-year amortization provision employed during the war
to encourage the construction of plants and equipment for
war production. A more flexible depreciation policy is
unanimously favored but some questions have arisen as to
the desirability of the departures from standard
accounting procedures which would be involved in an
acceleration of depreciation.
CAPITAL STOCK AND DECLARED-VALUE EXCESS-PROFITS TAXES
Minor elements in the corporation tax structure are
the declared-value capital stock tax and the
declared-value excess- profits tax; the latter is not to
be confused with the wartime excess-profits tax. [An
earlier capital stock tax based on the "fair"
value of capital stock was repealed in 1926, in part
because of difficulties of valuation. In the search for
revenues during the depression of the thirties a capital
stock tax was again imposed in 1933, but to avoid the
necessity for valuation the taxpayer was permitted to
declare once and for all any value he desired. To prevent
undervaluation a declared-value excess-profits tax was
imposed on all profits in excess of 10 percent of the
declared value of the capital stock. The taxes did not
stand as originally passed; taxpayers who had made
unfortunate declarations prevailed upon Congress to grant
a succession of new options to redeclare. Existing law
permits annual redeclarations.]
The combined amount of the two taxes is at a minimum
when the declared value is ten times the profits which
are realized during the year. Corporations with
unpredictable earnings will pay more than the minimum,
either through a higher-than-necessary declaration of
capital stock or through payment of the declared-value
excess-profits tax. The taxes are thus a sort of guessing
game bearing most heavily on corporations which cannot
accurately forecast their earnings. This group is likely
to include a disproportionate number of small companies,
new companies, and companies in fields of relatively
great risk.
The capital stock tax has been defended as a method of
taxing deficit corporations for benefits received. While
some other form of capital stock tax might have achieved
this result, the present tax does not. The deficit
corporation pays only when it has failed to anticipate
the deficit.
That the capital stock and declared-value
excess-profits taxes should be repealed as soon as
possible is unanimously agreed. Since the taxes are
deductible from income subject to income and excess-
profits taxes, the loss of revenue under present rates
would be largely offset by higher income and
excess-profits taxes.
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
It is almost a tax axiom that since taxes must
generally be paid from income, they should, insofar as
possible, be imposed directly on income. This principle
is supported by the fact that, although not perfect,
income is the best single measure of taxable capacity
which has thus for been developed, with few exceptions
the postwar tax planners are assigning the individual
income tax the most important role in the postwar tax
structure. Necessarily, this role involves rates far
above the prewar levels.
Few basic changes are proposed in the individual
income tax. Some people have urged the introduction of
averaging, but their proposals involve very substantial
complications. Retention of the withholding and current
payment features is generally assumed, and discussion
centers mostly around rates and exemptions. There is
growing recognition that such heavier taxes on the bulk
of the population will be necessary after the war than
before, and that an income tax with low exemptions and a
relatively high starting rate is preferable to heavy
reliance on sales and excise taxes. However, it is being
extensively debated whether reductions at the bottom to
protect consumption, or reductions in the brackets above
about $5,000 to encourage investment and risk-taking, are
more important to the health of the postwar economy.
Those who would introduce flexibility into the tax
structure by increasing taxes in boom periods and
reducing them in depression periods consider the
individual income tax, especially in the lower brackets,
the best place to apply the technique. Some would
accomplish the result through raising and lowering
personal exemptions, others by adjusting tax rates.
CAPITAL GAINS TAX
The treatment of capital gains has long been a source
of controversy in Federal taxation. It is worthy of note
that tax planners generally have recommended that the
present treatment of capital gains and losses be retained
until there is an opportunity for more through study or
until other postwar adjustment have been made. The view
that the present law is not too bad a compromise of the
various viewpoints is generally supported.
However, a few planners call for substantial revision
of capital gains taxation. Some would tax capital gains
at full income tax rates, although averaging the gains
over a period of years, and would tax accrued gains at
the time of making a gift or passing property at death.
At the other extreme are those who would eliminate
completely the capital gains tax and the deduction of
capital losses.
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
The estate tax and its companion gift tax are minor
revenue sources, yielding less than alcoholic beverages
or tobacco. Yet throughout the years there has been
widespread interest in these taxes, indicating that much
more important matters are at stake than the mere amount
revenue involved. The estate and gift taxes apply in only
about one percent of the adult deaths in the United
States, and a relatively small fraction of the estates
involved pay a large part of the total yield. Although
top rates are high, reaching 77 percent, the tax base
contains numerous avenues of tax reduction and avoidance
through such devices as life estates and trusts.
Wartime adjustments in estate and gift taxes have been
less sweeping than in the case of any other important
tax. This is not inappropriate since the estate tax is
not well adapted to emergency modification. However, if
other taxes remain at permanently higher levels,
recommendations to enlarge the yield of the estate tax
and its accompanying gift tax might be expected. In
general, however, the estate and gift taxes have
commanded little attention in plans for the immediate
postwar period. The planners appear to consider these
taxes a long-range problem to be taken up when other more
pressing postwar adjustments are completed. However,
technical committees have given considerable attention to
the coordination of the estates, gift and income taxes.
EXCISE AND SALES TAX.
The functions which excise taxes are generally
believed to perform in the Federal tax structure are to
keep down the rates of income tax and to reach classes of
taxpayers not touched by the income tax. The principal
objections voiced to excises are that they burden
consumption, fall inequitably on lower income groups, and
discriminate against the industries producing the taxed
goods and services. The excises in use by the Federal
Government are imposed largely on items of optional
expenditure. Thus the taxes are somewhat less
objectionable than a general sales tax would be because,
to the extent that they fall on the poor, they fall in an
optional way and thereby mitigate the sting of the tax
burden.
Postwar tax plans would in general continue use of
some of the excises. Liquor, tobacco and gasoline are the
most frequently mentioned commodities recommended for
continued excise taxation. However, some plans propose a
large excise tax program. Many of the programs condemn a
general sales tax because of its adverse effect on
consumption and its regressive incidence, but a few
recommend its adoption.
PAYROLL TAXES
Postwar tax planners have generally avoided the
subject of social security and payroll taxation on the
premise that they are outside the regular tax structure.
However, a strong sentiment to hold down the payroll
taxes is shared by groups which desire to limit social
security expansion and by groups which maintain that the
social security program should be financed by general
rather than by payroll taxation.
CONCLUSION
No one will deny that the Federal tax structure is an
intricate one. Obviously, in a short space it is
impossible to set down all of the issues and problems
involved in postwar tax readjustment. Some of those which
appear uppermost in the minds of postwar tax planners
have been briefly discussed. If undue emphasis appears to
have been placed on corporation taxes, that emphasis is
but a reflection of the fact that the postwar tax
planners have concentrated most of their proposals for
modification in this area.
An over-all view leads to the conclusion that the
problems of postwar tax adjustment will be more difficult
to solve than any tax problems heretofore faced by the
Federal Government. More emphasis than ever before has
been placed on the difficult problem of the effects of
taxation on the operation of the economy. Despite this
fact, it appears that current differences of opinion over
tax policy in the main follow the lines which are
familiar to students and observers of tax history.
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