Joel S. Newman is a professor of law at the Wake Forest University School of Law.
This article describes federal attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, to tax slavery before 1865. It analyzes the pre-1865 discourse on slave taxes as a form of sin taxes, from a contemporary perspective. Professor Newman would like to thank his colleague, Professor Michael Curtis, and Amanda Branam, WFU Law Class of 2004, for their help.
How do 18th and 19th century discussions of slave taxes as sin taxes compare to modern sin tax analysis? The economic discourse seems a bit lacking, since they probably did not think in quite those terms. However, the moral discourse is quite similar.
This essay will begin with a discussion of the issues raised by excise taxes generally and sin taxes in particular. It will then sketch a brief history of federal slave taxes, followed by a collection of statements made mostly on the floor of Congress, grouped according to the arguments made. It will conclude with some thoughts on who made the better case.
Vertical equity is also a problem. Does the incidence of wearing, manufacturing, and selling gloves fall in equal proportions on all income groups?6 If not, then depending on where they do fall, taxing gloves may be more progressive, or more regressive, than one might like.7
There are also compliance problems. Wouldn't it be far simpler to administer one broad tax than to administer dozens of narrow ones? Wouldn't keeping up with so many rates be a mind-boggling task for taxpayer and collector alike?
B. Sin Taxes: A Special Case
Taxing sin, however, might justify an excise tax, despite the problems. Taxes on commodities and activities which the society finds to be harmful, or even immoral, might be urged on both economic and moral grounds. Presumably, we can fix the economy, or even our moral fiber, and make a little money, too.
1. The economic argument. The economic grounds involve the internalization of external, social costs.8 Imagine, for example, that the government nationalized the steel industry and then provided steel for free to anyone who cared to use it. Bad idea. The price of automobiles, and other commodities made of steel, would drop precipitously.9 Anyone who had a choice of using steel or something else would choose steel. Decisions about when to use steel versus other components would be distorted in a radically inefficient way, to the competitive detriment of the nation.
The lesson is simple. To achieve a maximally efficient, national allocation of economic resources, the pricing of commodities and services needs to reflect their true costs. Automobile prices must include the costs of all of the material and labor that went into them, including, of course, steel. Only then will those who buy automobiles, and not the general taxpaying public, pay for all of the costs. Only then will the nation make the right choices between steel automobiles and their alternatives.
The market pricing mechanism works reasonably well for physical materials and labor. However, it works less well for social costs. The price of cigarettes, for example, reflects the material and labor that goes into them, but it does not reflect the social costs of smoking. Since these costs are not reflected, cigarettes are underpriced. Too many cigarettes are produced and consumed, and some of their costs are borne not by those who smoke, but by all of us.
If we cannot force the price of cigarettes to reflect directly the social costs incurred, then we should do the next best thing -- tax cigarettes. Such a tax will do two good things. First, by raising the price of cigarettes, it will deter smoking, thus eliminating some of the social costs. Second, for those who continue to smoke, it will create a fund of cigarette tax revenues, which can then be used to defray those social costs that remain.10
2. The moral argument. If behavior is immoral, then we should abolish it. If abolition is not possible, then taxation is the next best thing. Raise the taxes high enough, and we can price the behavior out of existence.11 Even if we can't raise the taxes to that level, at least we can make a strong statement of institutional disapproval. At the very least, if we tax moral activity, we had better tax immoral activity, lest we be accused of favoring immorality.12
These considerations can afford telling rejoinders to those who raise horizontal and vertical equity concerns. So what if everyone is not being taxed; that is precisely the point. The economist would argue that we are taxing only those people -- the sinners -- who pay too little. The moralist would argue that the immorality of the sin provides a rational basis for discriminating against the sinner. Any sinner who feels unfairly treated can simply stop sinning. Moreover, the manufacturers, distributors, and sellers would have no complaint if they simply stopped enabling the immorality of others.
3. Arguments against sin taxes. Even if sin taxes have some of the positive effects described, they have some negative effects as well. In addition to the problems of all excise taxes, they have their own specific infirmities. Doesn't taxation imply at least recognition, if not approval? Isn't it true that, once the government taxes something, it legitimizes it, and implicitly binds itself to protect that activity?
The problems are even worse if we assume that tax revenues will not be earmarked to defray the social costs of the activity being taxed. If so, isn't the government profiting from an unseemly and inappropriate partnership with sin?13 Won't the legislature secretly hope that the harmful, immoral activity continue, lest their tax revenues plummet?
Then there is the difficulty of determining, or at least reaching agreement, on precisely what is sinful, and how to get at it. Does everyone agree that drinking alcohol is sinful? Is the drinking of wine just as sinful as the drinking of beer or liquor? Moreover, if the real sin is drinking to excess, how do we attack the excess without unduly penalizing the moderate drinkers? Put in another context, is it better to tax the gas, or the gas guzzler?
Finally, doesn't it seem odd to use taxation as a form of punishment? Shouldn't punishment be the province of the criminal law, not the tax law? Isn't any other stance likely to sully both sets of laws, leaving them overly complex, and much harder to enforce and administer?14
How do slave taxes as sin taxes fit into this general scheme? What happened? What did the legislature say about it? How did their discourse fit into the arguments and analysis sketched out above?
In addition, the Constitution provided that the importation of slaves could not be banned until 1808.19 As long as the importation went on, however, the federal government was allowed to tax it, up to 10 dollars per person imported.20
B. Events Through the War of 1812
The 10 dollar tax, as allowed by the Constitution, was proposed in 1789 but went nowhere.21 A year later, a delegation of Quakers memorialized Congress to abolish slavery, and a tax was again considered. The proposal was tabled amid fears that any such tax would lead to arguments over whether slaves were persons or property.22
In 1797, a direct tax was proposed, in light of fiscal needs caused by the wars in Europe. It was enacted in 1798.23 A fixed sum would be levied to each state. Then, each state would allocate its share among its citizens, according to their ownership of houses, land, and slaves. The tax was intended to generate $2 million, of which $300,000 could come from a tax on slaves aged 12 to 50, at 50 cents per slave.24 It was abolished in 1802 when the fiscal need abated.25
In 1804, South Carolina, which had previously banned the importation of slaves, lifted its ban. Apparently, they could not enforce it, nor could they afford to try any longer.26 Nonetheless, the federal Congress was outraged, and debated a 10 dollar tax on the importation of slaves, largely with a view to punishing South Carolina.27 The measure was postponed, presumably to give South Carolina a chance to change its mind. Finally, it was dropped.
When the War of 1812 loomed, the federal government again needed money. Treasury Secretary Gallatin proposed a tax very similar to the 1798 tax, which was enacted in 1813. It was to be levied on land, houses, and slaves "at the rate each of them is worth in money."28 The tax was increased in 1815 and 1816, and finally repealed in 1817.29
C. Civil War
In the period leading up to the Civil War, there was considerable discussion of abolition, and its alternative, colonization. There was not much talk about taxation.30 Just before the Civil War, though, Hinton Rowan Helper proposed an elaborate scheme to tax slavery out of existence:
On May 28, 1862, Senator Charles Sumner proposed:
In the course of the discussion, there were proposals to set the tax at $5 per slave,34 and then $2 per slave.35 Senator John Sherman proposed an amendment to change slaves to cotton, with the thought that a tax on cotton would have the same incidence, without troublesome questions over whether slaves were property or persons.36 Sumner, however, objected, claiming sarcastically, "Slaves and cotton belong to the same section of country precisely as alligators and cotton."37 Sherman's amendment was ultimately rejected, 22 to 15.38
Later in the debate, there was a proposal to tax slavery only in those states without an emancipation plan in place.39 However, it was generally thought that this scheme, protective of the border states, would be illegal. There was ultimately a tax on cotton,40 but not on slaves. Finally, the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment made the issue of a slave tax moot.
A. Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity concerns were at the heart of the excise tax debates in the 19th century.41 Since the members of Congress represented geographical constituencies, geographical concerns were vociferously expressed. A tax on gloves was unfair to the town of Gloversville, New York.42 A tax on pig iron was unfair to Pennsylvania.43 Everyone professed a willingness to pay a fair share, but not more.
So it was with slave taxes. Of course, a slave tax by its nature would fall only on slaveholders, on slaveholding states, and on economies that depended on slave labor. When the tax was first proposed in 1789, Roger Sherman objected, saying:
The horizontal equity point was particularly troublesome in 1862. As Senator John Sherman rightly pointed out:
Vertical equity concerns, however, made for some strange bedfellows in the 1798 tax. Recall that a fixed levy was assigned to each state. Then, that levy was allocated among the citizens of each state in proportion to their ownership of land, houses, and slaves. In effect, allocating some of a state's burden to slaves meant that the share allocated to the ownership of real estate in that state was correspondingly reduced.49 And Congress knew it:
There were obvious compliance problems, especially in 1862, when the ones most likely to own the taxable commodities did not recognize the authority of the taxing government. As Senator Sherman52 pointed out, it simply would not do for the United States to take possession of a slave, and sell him for nonpayment of the slave tax. Clearly, such a sale would put the United States in an anomalous moral position.
D. The Economic Argument
The modern economic argument for a slave tax as sin tax would proceed as follows: The exploitation of slave labor by some people causes harm to all people. This harm, and its costs, should figure in the price of goods produced by this exploitation -- cotton and other agricultural products of the slaveholding states. If the market fails to internalize these costs, then the government must do so by levying a tax equal to those costs. If this tax does not completely abolish the behavior, then the government can use the tax revenues to alleviate the harm.
This analysis would pose the following questions:
(2) How, and whom, do we tax?
(3) What do we do with the tax revenues to alleviate the harm?
No legislator even approached this mode of analysis. Luther Martin, during the Constitutional Convention, at least recognized that slavery might benefit some at the expense of all when he said, "Slaves weakened one part of the Union, which the other parts were bound to protect."55 As to the cost of slavery, perhaps those who justified a slave tax by arguing that slavery caused the Civil War were implying that the cost of slavery was equal to the cost of the war.56 However, there was little direct discourse on cost.
As to whom to tax, there were proposals to tax imports,57 slaves,58 slaveowners,59 and cotton.60 Of course, this issue was complicated by the divisive arguments over whether slaves were property or persons. Finally, as to the use of the revenues, there was some thought of compensating former slaveholders for the loss of their slaves.61 There was much talk of colonization,62 but, before the Civil War, very little of reparations.63 In sum, perhaps one can back into some answers, but it is difficult when the right people weren't asking the right questions.
The 18th and 19th century legislators, then, did not address directly the economic issues inherent in slave taxes as sin taxes. Not surprisingly, without asking the questions, they did not answer them very well. Then again, who is to say that we moderns, in our sin tax discourse, have done any better?
E. The Moral Argument
1. The moral case for the taxation of slaves. There were two moral arguments:
Thomas Lowndes agreed, in an earlier session:
If our tax were in the nature of an encouragement, it would be clearly immoral. But it will be a discouragement. Exemption from taxation is encouragement. Taxation is discouragement just in proportion to its extent, until, in the progress of events, it becomes destructive. Looking at the present question in light of this principle, our course is plain. It is not permissible that we should encourage slavery, while every principle of economy and every sentiment of justice and humanity urges its discouragement.84
So who had the better argument? It is hard to tell, since so much of the argument was at cross purposes. The two sides did, however, cross swords directly on one issue -- phrased variously: Do taxes encourage or discourage the taxed activity? Do taxes imply an obligation on the part of the government to protect, or not?
A. Taxation as Discouragement
It is important to separate the behavioral response to taxation from the message taxation sends. As to behavioral response, it seems reasonably clear that taxpayers tend to do less of a taxed activity, as the taxes go up.85 As to governmental messages, things are less clear. Are we to consider the message received, or only the message intentionally sent?
It seems highly unlikely that broad-based taxes, such as income taxes and sales taxes, have inherent messages -- either sent or received. Surely, few among us believe that a tax on income is a legislative statement that income is bad.86 Narrow excise taxes, however, are something else again. Why, indeed, are gloves, or slaves, isolated for taxation when other commodities or activities are not? Can we deduce that these activities are to be condemned? Probably not. In most cases, the government levies excise taxes because that's where the money is. However, when the government makes direct statements about its reasons for taxation, we should be allowed to believe them. If the government says that we are taxing sin because it is sinful, they probably mean it.
So where does the argument lie? Does taxation discourage the taxed activity? Behaviorally, it discourages it. As a matter of legislative message, it discourages it only if the legislature says so directly.
B. Taxation as Encouragement
Does taxation ever encourage the taxed activity? Surely never, in terms of behavioral response. Surely never, in terms of direct legislative statements. Taxation does, however, recognize the taxed activity, and it might even legitimize it. If we tax slavery, then surely we are estopped from denying its existence. Moreover, we thereby grant it status as a category of serious, commercial, taxable enterprise -- like income, tobacco, and gloves.87
Does taxation imply an obligation to protect? Yes, in the sense that the government protects serious, commercial, taxable enterprises. Arguably yes, also, because, if government justifies taxation on the ground that it should be paid for protecting its citizens and their activities,88 then it follows that it should not tax that which it will not protect.
Should sin taxes be abolished, then, because they imply recognition and protection of the taxed activities? No, as long as the government is careful to tell us why it levies the tax. One would think that direct legislative statements against sin would trump whatever pro-sin inferences one might draw.
C. So Who Won?
Despite my feeling that the pro-sin-tax forces won the one argument when the issue was joined, I still feel that the anti-sin- tax crowd wins the day -- in this century, and in previous ones. I begin, in an increasingly heterogeneous society, with a great reluctance to see the government legislate morality. Even in those cases in which governmental intervention might be appropriate, I still would prefer some approach other than taxation. The tax code is in enough trouble already, without further adventures in social engineering, far more likely to offend and divide the taxpayers than they are to achieve their stated purpose.
Finally, although I am not overly concerned about the perception of an unseemly partnership between government and sinner, I am concerned about the reality. In an age of declining public funds, there is a real danger that governments will develop a dependency relationship with anything that might generate needed tax revenue. Such a dependency can arise even for activities the government claims to abhor.89
Our market economy is far from perfect. Sometimes not all social costs are figured in the market price of a commodity. Unfortunately, taxes cannot fix that. Our morality is not perfect either. Sometimes, commodities and activities that some of us deem immoral are traded and practiced. Unfortunately, taxes cannot fix that, either. What is more, any attempted fix is far more likely to harm the tax system than it is to improve either our economy or our morals.
It is probably just as well that we never did enact a federal slave tax as a sin tax. Then again, it is probably a good thing that we at least talked about it.
Pennsylvania may have taxed slavery on sin tax grounds. See W.E.B. DuBois, The Suppression of the African Slave Trade 20-24 (Russell & Russell 1965) (1898).
2 Although there is considerable overlap between the set of rich people and the set of sinners, the two are not identical.
3 Excise taxes were considered far less intrusive than income taxes. The British introduced their schedular system at least in part on similar privacy grounds. See John Tiley, Revenue Law, 3d ed. 39 (1981). The New York state Chamber of Commerce, in a report to the U.S. Congress, said the following about an income tax, which they characterized as "already odious to the people before its operation has been felt":
Excise taxes are also relatively painless. Justin Morrill, Chair of the Ways and Means Committee, said in 1862:
However, levying some excise taxes can create a horizontal equity argument for levying even more excise taxes. If we have already decided to tax overcoats, galoshes, scarves, and mittens, then don't we have to tax gloves? Wouldn't failure to tax gloves then be an unwarranted subsidy on the glove industry and glove wearers?
5 Senator Harris of New York was quite concerned about the impact of an excise tax on leathers on his constituents in Gloversville, N.Y. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2400 (1862). For a discussion of the relative fairness and unfairness, in geographical and horizontal equity terms, of various commodities, see Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. (1862) at 1405 (iron) 1405- 6, 1408 (coal) 1406 (pig iron). See generally Congressional Budget Office, Federal Taxation of Tobacco, Alcoholic Beverages, and Motor Fuels (1990); Joel Newman, "The Whiskey Rebellion Was a Regional Dispute, and It Still Is," Tax Notes, Sept. 10, 1990, p. 1423.
6 See generally Federal Excise Tax Structure, Panel Discussion Before the House Ways and Means Committee, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 39 (statement of Professor Douglas Eldridge).
7 For early arguments that a duty on salt was a regressive duty, falling disproportionately on low-income groups, see Einhorn, supra note 3, at 165; Annals of Cong., 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1118-1124 (1812). For a discussion of the carriage tax, which was an early version of a luxury tax, see infra note 41. Notions of luxury change. In 1789, Fisher Ames of Massachusetts proposed duties on "china, crockeryware, and gunpowder, all of which he considered to be luxuries. Annals of Cong., 1st Cong. 1st Sess. 349 (1789). On luxury taxes generally, see Joel Newman, "Ex-Lux," Tax Notes, Apr. 13, 1992, p. 253.
8 See generally Norman Ture, "Social Policy and Excise Taxes," Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 1988, p. 737.
9 Alternatively, the automobile manufacturers might keep automobile prices constant and pocket the profits. This reaction, admittedly unlikely in a competitive industry, would have equally distortive effects.
10 Private litigation damages might have the same effect on both counts. See generally Graduated Cigarette Tax, Hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee, 83rd Cong. 1st Sess, for all sorts of arguments against the above analysis.
The second effect occurs only if the legislature has the discipline to earmark the tax revenues for this purpose. Few legislatures have this discipline.
11 "An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, the power to destroy." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819). Then again, perhaps high taxation will simply drive the activity underground.
12 The Supreme Court noted that we had to tax unlawful income " . . . to remove the incongruity of having the gains of the honest laborer taxed and the gains of the dishonest immune." James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 , 218 (1961).
13 The British version of this argument is "His majesty's government does not share in the profits of prostitutes." I have had trouble tracking down this quote, but I believe it relates to the time when the British Government rented crown property to houses of ill repute.
For an American version of this argument see Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1926): "The moral degradation, arising from the endeavor by law to collect a necessarily lawful tax out of occupations by equal necessity unlawful, corrupting, and immoral, may well give one pause"; and in Judge Manton's concurring opinion:
14 "Moral turpitude is not a touchstone of taxability." James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 226 (1961) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black). If the taxed activity is criminal, and the tax itself is too punitive, then double jeopardy questions arise. See Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994). See generally Leo Martinez, "Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy," 1994 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 521.
In this regard, fines and imprisonment for carrying on the slave trade are much more defensible than taxation. See 18 U.S.C. section 1582.
15 In 1782, Robert Morris proposed a poll tax of one dollar on all male slaves between the ages of 16 and 60, but it got nowhere. John Catanzariti and E. James Ferguson, eds., 6 The Papers of Robert Morris 65 (1984). It became abundantly clear that the slavery issue was extremely divisive. Compromise was essential, if there was to be a union at all. Consider John Lynch's statement in the 1776 attempt to draft Articles of Confederation, on behalf of his South Carolina constituents: "If it is debated, whether their Slaves are their Property, there is an end to the Confederation." Einhorn, supra note 3, at 159.
16 U.S. Const. Art. I section 2.
17 U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9 applied the same apportionment rule to direct taxes and capitation taxes. John Rutledge of South Carolina actually first proposed using three-fifths of the slaves to apportion taxes in 1783. Einhorn, supra note 3, at 163.
18 Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation. No one answered. Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (N.Y. 1987) 494. See generally Bruce Ackerman, "Taxation and the Constitution," 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1999).
19 U.S. Const. Art. I section 9. If importation of new slaves were to cease, then the price of the slaves already here would go up. States like Virginia, who were thought to make more money selling slaves than using them, would profit.
21 Einhorn, supra note 3, at 165, Annals of Cong. 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 349-355 (1789).
22 Annals of Cong., 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 1224 (1790).
23 The only significant discussion can be found at Annals of Cong., 5th Cong. 2nd Sess. 2058-2061. There was no discussion of sin taxes.
24 Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 70, "An Act to provide for the valuation of lands and dwelling-houses, and the enumeration of slaves within the United States" Einhorn, supra note 3, at 179.
25 Act of April 6, 1802, ch. 19, "An Act to Repeal Internal Taxes" 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 148-150.
26 Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. February, 992. (1804).
27 "Had I been informed that some formidable foreign power had invaded our country, I would not, I ought not, be more alarmed than on hearing that South Carolina had repealed her law prohibiting the importation of slaves." Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 820 (1804) (David Bard of Pennsylvania).
28 Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 16, "An act for the Assessment and Collection of Direct Taxes and Internal Duties section 5" 3 U.S. Statutes at Large 22, 26. The only significant discussion found was at Annals of Cong., 13th Cong. 1st Sess., House, 319-328. Sin tax issues were not mentioned.
The change from fixed valuation to actual valuation reflects the most significant issue in state slave taxes. See, e.g., Donald Butts, supra note 1.
29 3 Statutes at Large 164 (1815); 3 Statutes at Large 255 (1816); 3 Statutes at Large 401 (1817).
30 However, there was a failed attempt to finance the Mexican War in part on slave taxes. Kevin Outterson, supra note 1 at n.115; Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in America 44 (1942).
31 Hinton Rowan Helper, The Impending Crisis of the South and How to Meet It (1857) 178.
32 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., 2401 (1862) (Sen. Charles Sumner, N.Y.).
33 Apparently, the Senate Finance Committee approved in principle. Id at 2402. It was quickly agreed that parents who used the labor of their children should be exempt. Id. at 2403.
34 Id. at 2402.
35 Id. at 2406.
36 Id. at 2403 (John Sherman of Ohio).
37 Id. at 2403.
38 Id. at 2407.
39 Id. at 2407.
40 Id. at 2540-2541 for discussion of cotton.
41 Remember that the three-fifths compromise itself could be described in horizontal equity terms. Is it fair to levy a larger share of direct tax allocations on a slaveholding state? This concern was thought to be largely moot in 1789. However, in 1796, it became potentially more real. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), held that a carriage tax could be constitutionally levied without apportionment. Many in the South were greatly concerned, for fear that Hylton v. United States paved the way for a constitutionally legal slave tax, which would in turn be the first step toward the abolition of slavery. See Einhorn, supra note 3 at 169-173 for discussion of Hylton. See also Bruce Ackerman, supra note 18.
42 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2400 (1862).
43 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1406-1407 (1862).
44 Annals of Cong., 1st Cong. 1st Sess. 351 (1789) (Roger Sherman of Connecticut). In 1804, Thomas Lowndes of South Carolina had a similar objection: But, Mr. Speaker, my greatest objection to this tax is, that it will fall exclusively on the agriculture of the State of which I am one of the Representatives. Annals of Cong., 8th Cong. 1st Sess. 993 (1804).
45 Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 994 (1804).
46 Annals of Cong., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1789).
47 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2402 (1862) (John Sherman of Ohio).
48 Note 41 supra.
49 John Page, also of Virginia, made the curious comment that one paying relatively high land taxes in a nonslaveholding state could at least garner the satisfaction "that his state was free from that evil." Annals of Cong., 4th cong., 2nd Sess. 1939. (1797). Einhorn, supra note 3 at 182.
50 Annals of Cong., 4th Cong., 2d Sess. 1935 (1797).
51 Annals of Cong., 5th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2058- 2061. See also Einhorn, supra note 3 at 179.
53 Hinton Rowan Helper, supra note 31 at 124.
54 Id. at 156.
55 Jonathan Eliot, Debates, 2d ed. 457 (1996).
56 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2402 (1862) (Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts); see also, "The Treasury Report," The New York Times, July 8, 1861.
57 Supra notes 21, 22.
58 Supra note 23, 28.
59 Supra note 32.
60 Supra note 36.
61 In 1790, Representative Jackson asked, "I would beg to ask those who are desirous of freeing the Negroes, if they have funds sufficient to pay for them?" Annals of Cong., 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 1228 (1790). President Lincoln also favored paying for freed slaves. Carl Wieck, Lincoln's Quest for Equality, 136 (2003).
62 William Richardson of Illinois proposed that 2 percent of the 1862 tax revenues be used to provide land for freed slaves. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1217 (1862). See also Act of April 16, 1862, ch. 54; 12 U.S. Statutes at Large 376; Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 182; 12 U.S. Statutes at Large 582, both providing funds for colonization of slaves freed from the District of Columbia.
63 For post-Civil War reparations proposals, see, e.g., S. 60, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866), and Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1867). See Kevin Outterson, supra note 1, for modern proposals for reparations.
64 Annals of Cong., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 349 (1789) (Josiah Parker of Virginia).
65 Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 819 (1804) (David Bard of Pennsylvania).
66 Id. at 1009 (John Lucas of Pennsylvania).
67 Eliot's Debates 459 (James Wilson of Pennsylvania). Also, Mr. Mason said during the Constitutional Convention, "Not to tax will be equivalent to a bounty on the importation of slaves." Quoted at Cong. Globe, 37th Cong. 2d Sess. 151 (1862). Two congressmen from Pennsylvania in 1804 were similarly concerned. Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 1025 (1804). Thomas Lowndes attributes these feelings to Mr. Gregg and Mr. Smilie.
68 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2405 (1862) (Timothy Howe of Wisconsin).
69 Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 1006 (1804) (Benjamin Huger of South Carolina).
70 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2402 (1862) (John Sherman of Ohio).
71 Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 1003 (1804) (Thomas Moore of South Carolina).
72 Id. at 997 (George Bedinger of Kentucky).
73 Id. at 1003 (Thomas Lowndes of South Carolina).
74 Id. at 992-993.
75 Annals of Cong., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 351 (1789) (Fisher Ames of Massachusetts).
76 Id. at 1025.
77 Id. at 1029 (Roger Griswold of Connecticut).
78 Id at 998 (Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina).
79 Id. at 1007 (James Holland of North Carolina).
80 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2405 (1862) (Samuel Pomery of Kansas).
81 Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033 (1804) (Caesar Rodney of Delaware).
82 Id. at 1002 (Samuel Mitchill of New York).
83 Id. at 1032. Alas -- there were members of Congress named Jackson from both Georgia and Virginia.
84 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1862) (Charles Sumner of Massachusetts).
85 Admittedly, as to income taxation, there is the substitution effect, and the income effect, which have opposite consequences. However, I am not convinced that both effects exist when one is taxing sin. Higher income taxes might well inspire some to earn more dollars so that they still have enough dollars after tax. Higher cigarette taxes, however, will not inspire anyone to buy more cigarettes so that they have more cigarettes after tax. Income dollars and tax dollars are exchangeable. Cigarettes and tax dollars are not.
86 There are those who propose spending taxes, however, at least in part to communicate the notion that spending is bad.
87 Does our failure to tax imputed income from household services demean housework in an inappropriate way? See Nancy Staudt, "Taxing Housework," 84 Geo. L. J. 1571 (1976); see also Katharine Silbaugh, "Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law," 91 NW U. L. Rev. 1 (1996).
88 See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
89 See Profile: States Becoming More Dependent on Cigarette Taxes (NPR radio broadcast, June 17, 2003).